According to Hume, what are the two kinds of ideas?

According to Hume, what are the two kinds of ideas? What are their sources? What are the two kinds of associations of ideas in the mind?

In a paragraph of at most fifteen sentences execute the following question also Provide quotations.Ensure you properly punctuate the quotation and cite the passage (use parenthetical notation). Please answer the question just using the readings attached by me to this question. No header, no page number, no cover page needed and no space between sentences please,

Chapter 8 

Excerpts from Equiry Concerning 

Human Understanding by David 

Hume 

Contents 

8.1 Of the Origin of Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 

8.2 Of the Association of Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 

8.3 Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations . . . . . . . 101 

8.4 Of Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 

8.5 Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 

8.1 Of the Origin of Ideas 

11. Everyone will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between 

The perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive 

Heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls 

To his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These 

Faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never 

Can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The 

Utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, 

That they represent their object in so lively a manner that we could almost 

Say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by disease 

Or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render 

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these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, 

however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to 

make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought 

is still inferior to the dullest sensation. 

We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions 

of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner 

from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person 

is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of 

his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders 

and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and 

affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; 

but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of 

those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice 

discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them. 

12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two 

classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of 

force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated 

Thoughts or Ideas. The other species want a name in our language, 

and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but 

philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. 

Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; 

employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By 

the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when 

we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions 

are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, 

of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or 

movements above mentioned. 

13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of 

man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not 

even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, 

and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no 

more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And 

while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain 

and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most 

distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded 

chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What 

never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is anything be- 

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yond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction. 

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall 

find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow 

limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no 

more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing 

the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When 

we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, 

and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous 

horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive 

virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is 

an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived 

either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition 

of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself 

in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are 

copies of our impressions or more lively ones. 

14. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. 

First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or 

sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple 

ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those 

ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, 

upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning 

an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on 

the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those 

qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to 

what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which 

we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert 

that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only 

one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, 

in their opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent 

on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or 

lively perception, which corresponds to it. 

15. Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not 

susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little 

susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion 

of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense in 

which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations, you 

also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving 

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these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any 

sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negro 

has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no instances 

of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or 

is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to his species; 

yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree. A man of 

mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can 

a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It 

is readily allowed, that other beings may possess many senses of which 

we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been 

introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to 

the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensation. 

16. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove 

that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their 

correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the 

several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, 

which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, 

at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it 

must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each 

shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should 

be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a 

colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow 

any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny 

the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed 

his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted 

with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, 

which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different 

shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending 

gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will 

perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that 

there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours 

than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his 

own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the 

idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him 

by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: 

and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in 

every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this 

instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does 

not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim. 

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17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple 

and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every 

dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so 

long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace 

upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and 

obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt to be confounded 

with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed 

any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has 

a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, 

all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: the limits 

between them are more exactly determined: nor is it easy to fall into any 

error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any 

suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning 

or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression 

is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, 

this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear 

a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, 

concerning their nature and reality.1 

1It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied innate ideas, than that all 

ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which 

they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent 

all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent 

to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate 

or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is 

uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our birth, the 

dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, 

whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be commonly taken 

in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our 

sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should desire to know, 

what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion 

between the sexes is not innate? 

But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, in the sense above explained, and understanding 

by innate, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may 

we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate. 

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Locke was betrayed into this question 

by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a 

tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution 

seem to run through that philosopher’s reasonings on this as well as most other 

subjects. 

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8.2 Of the Association of Ideas 

18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different 

thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the 

memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree 

of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse 

this is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks 

in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked 

and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, 

nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination 

ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion 

upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. 

Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would 

immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. 

Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of 

discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his 

mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the 

subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we 

cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that 

the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly 

correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended 

in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal 

principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind. 

19. Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are 

connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted 

to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, 

that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only 

three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity 

in time or place, and Cause or Effect. 

That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much 

doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original:2 the 

mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry 

or discourse concerning the others:3 and if we think of a wound, 

we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.4 But 

that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles 

of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satis- 

2Resemblance 

3Contiguity 

4Cause and Effect. 

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faction of the reader, or even to a man’s own satisfaction. All we can 

do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully 

the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other, 

never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible.5 The 

more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more 

assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from 

the whole, is complete and entire. 

8.3 Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations 

of the Understanding 

Part I 

20. All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided 

into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first 

kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in 

short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively 

certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two 

sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. 

That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between 

these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the 

mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere 

existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in 

nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their 

certainty and evidence. 

21. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not 

ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, 

however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of 

every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, 

and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and 

distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will 

not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no 

more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in 

5For instance, Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas: but it may, perhaps, 

be considered as a mixture of Causation and Resemblance. Where two objects are 

contrary, the one destroys the other; that is, the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the 

annihilation of an object, implies the idea of its former existence. 

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vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively 

false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be 

distinctly conceived by the mind. 

It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what 

is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence 

and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the 

records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has 

been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore 

our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, 

may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult 

paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, 

by exciting curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, 

which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of 

defects in the common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, 

be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to 

attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed 

to the public. 

22. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation 

of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go 

beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a 

man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, 

that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a 

reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received 

from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. 

A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would 

conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings 

concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly 

supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that 

which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, 

the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate 

voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence 

of some person: Why? because these are the effects of the human make 

and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other 

reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the 

relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, 

direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, 

and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other. 

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23. If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that 

evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how 

we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect. 

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no 

exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, 

attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, 

when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with 

each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural 

reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will 

not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, 

to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties 

be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have 

inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate 

him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume 

him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the 

senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will 

arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw 

any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. 

24. This proposition, that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but 

by experience, will readily be admitted with regard to such objects, as 

we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we 

must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of 

foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces 

of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will 

never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to 

require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make 

so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear little 

analogy to the common course of nature, are also readily confessed 

to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the 

explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever 

be discovered by arguments a priori. In like manner, when an effect is 

supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure 

of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it 

to experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, 

why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or 

a tiger? 

But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same evidence 

with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from 

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our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the 

whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the 

simple qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We 

are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere 

operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we 

brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred 

that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; 

and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order 

to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of 

custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, 

but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely 

because it is found in the highest degree. 

25. But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of 

bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following 

reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to us, 

and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will 

result from it, without consulting past observation; after what manner, 

I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must 

invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect; 

and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The 

mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the 

most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different 

from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. 

Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion 

in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest 

hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left 

without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a 

priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget 

the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, 

in the stone or metal? And as the first imagination or invention of a 

particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we consult 

not experience; so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion 

between the cause and effect, which binds them together, and 

renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation 

of that cause. When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a 

straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball 

should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or 

impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as 

well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at ab- 

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solute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off 

from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are 

consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference 

to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All 

our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation 

for this preference. 

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could 

not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or 

conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it 

is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally 

arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, 

must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should 

we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, 

without the assistance of observation and experience. 

26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational 

and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of 

any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, 

which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that 

the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive 

of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the 

many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings 

from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of 

these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor 

shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication 

of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut 

up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of 

parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the 

ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; 

and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry 

and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or 

near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the 

natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps 

the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves 

only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human 

blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us 

at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it. 

27. Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy, 

ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ulti- 

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mate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly 

celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition 

that certain laws are established by nature in her operations; 

and abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience in the 

discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular 

instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and 

quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, discovered by experience, that 

the moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio 

or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity; and consequently, 

that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest 

weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can increase the 

velocity of that force, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. 

Geometry assists us in the application of this law, by giving us the just 

dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species 

of machine; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to 

experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never 

lead us one step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason a priori, 

and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, 

independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion 

of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable 

and inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very 

sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of 

heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with the 

operation of these qualities. 

Part II 

28. But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to 

the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new question 

as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. 

When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter 

of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on 

the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the 

foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it 

may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on our 

sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? 

this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult 

solution and explication. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior 

wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter 

persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner 

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to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some 

dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is 

to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the difficulty 

ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a 

kind of merit of our very ignorance. 

I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend 

only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I 

say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause 

and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on 

reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must 

endeavour both to explain and to defend. 

29. It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance 

from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few 

superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers 

and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. 

Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of 

bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities 

which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. 

Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but 

as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving 

body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies 

never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form 

the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of 

natural powers6 and principles, we always presume, when we see like 

sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that 

effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from 

them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which 

we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating 

the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment 

and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I 

would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that 

there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret 

powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a 

conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything 

which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience, it can be 

allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects 

6The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication 

of it would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7. 

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only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: 

but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to 

other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance 

similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, 

which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible 

qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does 

it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and 

that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret 

powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must 

be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; 

that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, 

which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being 

the same, I have found that such an object has always been attended 

with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, 

similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, 

that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, 

in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is 

made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. 

The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is 

required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, 

if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that 

medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent 

on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the 

origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact. 

30. This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, become altogether 

convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall 

turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any 

connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the understanding 

in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every 

reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because 

an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really 

exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult 

task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, 

endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument. 

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative 

reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, 

or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are 

no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies 

no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an ob- 

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ject, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended 

with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive 

that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, 

resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is 

there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees 

will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? 

Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies 

no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative 

argument or abstract reasoning priori. 

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, 

and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments 

must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real 

existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that there 

is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that 

species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have 

said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation 

of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived 

entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions 

proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to 

the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by 

probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently 

going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very 

point in question. 

31. In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity 

which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are 

induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow 

from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will 

ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that 

great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to 

have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human 

nature, which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us 

draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among 

different objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar 

effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it 

seems evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would 

be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a 

course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as 

eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the 

same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of 

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uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and 

security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process 

of reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different 

from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise 

different from that single one? This question I propose as much for 

the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I 

cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind 

still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me. 

32. Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we infer 

a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, 

I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. 

The question still recurs, on what process of argument this inference 

is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join 

propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour, 

consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, 

to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment 

and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from 

the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experience; 

contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to 

plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state of ignorance with 

regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied 

by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting 

from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects, 

at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. 

When a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, 

we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. 

From a body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like 

nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the 

mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, I have found, in 

all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: 

And when he says, Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with 

similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions 

in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an 

inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is 

not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To 

say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from 

experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble 

the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible 

qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may 

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change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience 

becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is 

impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove 

this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments 

are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of 

things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some 

new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it